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cards. In his younger years he saw facts and gaged their value with an unerring eye. In later years success seems to have robbed him of this power. In the German campaign of 1813, he could, by European guaranty, have saved France to himself and his family, with its limits of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; he was not wise enough to accept these terms, and his personal ambition realized naught. Napoleon's labors were limited to working out the results of the French Revolution, and preserving for France, Italy, and the adjoining states the instincts of liberty which have helped them out of the slough of tyranny. What more he might have created could not be maintained by any one less strong, and men of his stamp are rare. His scheme to emulate Charles the Great was bound to fail.

This volume is furnished with nine diagrammatic charts which elucidate the text, with a chronological table and a bibliographical note at the end of each chapter, and with an appendix giving the family tree of the Bonapartes, and showing how Prince Victor still represents the imperial aspirations of a considerable body of Frenchmen. The style is strong and fluent, and the book is well printed on good paper. For any one — and in busy to-day there are many such — that simply desires to refresh his memory as to the two Napoleonic decades, no volume can be more highly commended. The most interesting of the charts is opposite page 170. It shows at a glance how large a part of Europe Napoleon had added to France in 1809. Had a few of the great rivers been added to orient the whole, and had the ante-Revolutionary limits of France been inserted in black, the chart would have been yet more effective.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

*Hanover and Prussia, 1795-1803: a Study in Neutrality.* By GUY STANTON FORD, Ph.D. [Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XVIII., No. 3.] (New York: The Macmillan Company; London: P. S. King and Son. 1903. Pp. 316.)

THE twenty years from the death of Frederick the Great to the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine is still for Prussian history largely a *terra incognita*, especially to English readers. Sorel has done much to elucidate the diplomatic intricacies of the earlier part of this period, and the great Prussian statesmen and reformers of the Liberation Era have had their biographers. Dr. Ford's admirable study now gives a very satisfactory account of the diplomatic history from the peace of Basel to 1803. In writing of Hanover it has been usual to assume as a matter of course that since George III. ruled in England and in the Electorate, there is a close connection between English and Hanoverian policy, and that the former determined the latter. Dr. Ford's whole thesis goes to show that this is not so; that in reality any close study of Hanoverian policy at once necessitates a study of that of Prussia. Prussian, not

English, interests determined Hanover's fortunes. For instance, in 1795, though England remained at war with France, and Pitt stated in the House of Commons that "the Elector of Hanover will never separate himself from the King of England", nevertheless Hanover soon found it necessary to adopt neutrality and come within the line of demarcation which Prussia had established for her. The treaty of Basel, instead of being the diplomatic revolution in Prussian policy and "the greatest political mistake of our modern history" as Treitschke vigorously asserted, was in reality a return to Prussia's natural policy of friendship with France. "Prussia, viewing things as they were at the time of the treaty of Basel, was justified in thinking the moderate policy would triumph in France and be satisfied with Belgium, Luxemburg, and Savoy, and that Prussia needed her strength to face the powers beyond the Danube and the Vistula rather than those of the Seine" (p. 57).

Of especial interest from the point of view of international law is the development and failure of the neutrality idea. The idea in itself was a good one, but its practical execution at once met with difficulty. The French did not strictly observe the original line of demarcation, and a new one had to be drawn in 1796. It soon became clear that some kind of a "demarcation army" was necessary to make neutrality mean anything in view of the ever-encroaching French frontiers; in short, that the only kind of a neutrality that is good for anything is an armed neutrality. But Prussia's actual army was not large enough for this purpose, and her dilapidated finances did not permit any great increase in her forces. Meanwhile the minor states within the line were too jealous and distrustful of Prussia either to grant her subsidies or to raise a force of their own. In the negotiations which aimed to raise a demarcation army, and especially in the Hildesheim Congress of 1796-1797, many persons hopefully looked forward to a definite hegemony of Prussia in North Germany, either through the grouping of states in a revived *Fürstenbund* or by a division of the empire between Austria and Prussia. But all such hopes were rudely shaken by the czar of Russia. The year 1801 gave the *coup de grâce* to neutrality. The mad Paul, after a bitter and extreme hatred of France, had suddenly, by a violent reaction, become an enthusiastic admirer of Napoleon and an uncompromising foe of his recent ally, England. He was eager to do anything to injure England. Therefore he suggested to Frederick William III. that he occupy Hanover, close the Elbe and the Weser to English commerce, and ultimately keep the Electorate as an indemnity for the Rhine lands which he had given up to France. Frederick William hesitated: he had given his word of honor that he did not intend to take Hanover; he had always maintained that the Electorate was distinct from England and should not be made to suffer on account of England's wars; he saw it would embroil him with England and probably compromise his neutrality. Therefore he still hesitated. On March 25, 1801, he was abruptly informed by Krüdener that unless Prussian troops were sent within twenty-four hours to occupy Hanover, Russia would withdraw

her ambassador from Berlin and send 80,000 Russians into Prussia! On March 26, "with tears in his eyes", Frederick William complied. This action opened him to the charge of breaking his promises, of pursuing a greedy policy of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of his neighbors, and of weakly knuckling to the demands of Napoleon and Paul. It was humiliating, but it was not the worst. After a few weeks Paul died. Alexander reversed his policy, made peace with England, and expressed his wish that Hanover be restored to George III. A second time Prussia did Russia's bidding. To the diplomats of the time this was an open confession of weakness. After 1801 no one need be surprised at 1806.

Dr. Ford's study is based on a careful examination of the archives of Hanover, Dresden, and London and of the printed sources, and is of much value and interest to the student of this period.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

*Catalogue of Parliamentary Papers, 1801-1900, with a few of Earlier Date.* Compiled by HILDA VERNON JONES. (London: P. S. King and Son. 1904. Pp. viii, 317.)

THE great and constantly increasing mass of literature published for the British government and long generally known as blue books had its beginnings in the present form as comparatively recently as 1837. Reports from state departments were submitted to Parliament from about the time of the Revolution; but until 1801 few of them were officially printed in separate form. They were usually spread in full on the journals, as were also the reports of Parliamentary committees; and when the *Journals* were printed these reports for the first time became generally accessible. There has never been a government printing bureau in England. Government printing was first done by the holders of patents from the crown, and later on by contractors; and at no time have the reports of Parliamentary committees and royal commissions been gratuitously distributed. They have been, as they are to-day, sold at cost through the authorized government publishers, a method of issue dating from 1837.

Since 1801 it has been customary to print in blue-book form reports which previous to that time were inserted in the journals; but for many years after this plan was adopted public documents as a general rule were obtainable at the time of issue, only through members of Parliament. There must always have been some demand for Parliamentary papers; for in several of the eighteenth-century post-office statutes there were clauses providing that they should be carried postage free. Members of both Houses of Parliament at this time enjoyed the now-long-abolished privilege of franking; but in the latter part of this period the number of letters a member of Parliament might receive or send without payment of postage was rigidly limited. Hence the necessity for special provision in the post-office acts for Parliamentary papers. This public interest in Parliamentary documents is also further borne out by the fact that as early as 1773 a selec-